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Perspectives: Theorizing Mediatized Civic
Settings and Cultural Conflict
Abstract: This chapter reflects on how the interplay between national media
frames and discourses, social media, and user-generated content works out in
practice in civic settings. It argues that while social media in theory break na-
tional elites’ representational monopoly, in practice successful challenges
(which would shift mass media frames and overall public opinion) are rare; rath-
er, voicing of alternative views mostly results in the formation of networked
counter-publics, with potential to challenge mainstream views but also to in-
crease polarization. These dangers may be exacerbated by an increasingly un-
even spatial distribution of both religious diversity and anti-immigrant senti-
ment, shown in levels of religious participation by ethnicity and voting
patterns by region. The challenges posed for local governance by this situation
are outlined, and possible solutions briefly considered, drawing on evidence
from the literatures on superdiversity, contact theory, and political participation.
Keywords: mediatized civic settings, spatial distribution of diversity, digital hy-
bridization, agency, networked crowd
9.1 Introduction
This chapter sets the scene for the case studies of mediatized cultural conflict in
the three chapters that follow. None are neighbourhood studies in a classic eth-
nographic sense, but rather range across scales to capture the interplay between
them created by intensified media communications. Hence Repstad (Chapter 10)
examines connections (and disconnections) between national media frames, po-
litical discourse, and local media representations in his study of the discourse on
refugees amongst churches in Southern Norway; Liebmann (Chapter 11) traces
links between national media frames, social media posts, the funding of local
inter-faith groups, and the experiences and actions of residents in multi-ethnic
neighbourhoods in Eastern and Southern Norway; and Hansen and Herbert
(Chapter 12) investigate how Muslims in the Greater Copenhagen area in Den-
mark respond to a negative national media frame, and reflect on the conditions
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shaping the formation and acceptance of multiple identities as a key ingredient
in cooperative community relations.
The aim of this chapter is to situate these case studies in the broader context
of theories and empirical work relevant to the relationship between mediatiza-
tion and other processes of social change at work in local civic settings. While
there are studies of various relevant factors including the role of transnational
media networks in the lives of diasporic minorities (Gillespie, Herbert, and An-
derson 2010; Rinawwi 2012), citizens’ use of media for a sense of public connec-
tion (Couldry and Markham 2008), and the mobilizing capacities of Web 2.0 so-
cial media for social protest (Theocharis 2013), the impact of mediatization on
relationships and experience in local settings remains relatively underdevel-
oped, creating a gap between locality (and especially urban, as the main
locus of religious diversity in contemporary European societies) studies and
media studies. This section of the book, drawing on both CoMRel and its sister
project Cultural Conflict 2.0: The Dynamics of Religion, Media and Locality in
North European Cities,¹ seeks to address that gap.
In their introduction to media dynamics in Chapter 3, Hjarvard and Lundby
provide a framework for conceptualizing media as embedded in and partly con-
stitutive of social relations, outlining three types of dynamics through which
media permeate and reshape them (amplification, framing and performative
agency, co-structuring). They also emphasize, especially in their conclusion,
that individual agency can still make a difference to outcomes, despite the pow-
erful structuring forces at work. This chapter seeks to build on that account by
examining how civic dynamics interact with media dynamics, and the conditions
under which this interaction occurs, drawing on perspectives from a range of re-
sources to conceptualize mediatized civic settings and the forms of agency emer-
gent within them.
9.2 Mediatized Civic Settings
The city … does not end with the visibly observable. … Urban spaces are becoming hybri-
dized, meaning they are composed through a combination of physical and digital proper-
ties. (Gordon and de Souza e Silva 2011, 1, 14)
In mediated societies – societies where media institutions have a dominant role and most,
if not all, of our information about what is going beyond our immediate locality on comes
from media – it is impossible to separate the recognition individuals get from each other
from the way media resources are distributed. (Couldry 2011, 48)
 Grant No. 231344. Our thanks to the Research Council of Norway for funding this project.
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How people experience their own neighbourhood of residence, and those they
work in, pass through or visit, has always been mediated by the impressions
of others, whether through local gossip, newspaper accounts, or perhaps by trav-
el guidebooks in the case of larger cities and favoured tourist destinations. How-
ever, changes in media technologies and their uses have significantly altered and
arguably intensified the role of the media in shaping our experience of locality.
First, the combination of digital mapping, geo-locating, and social media
technologies has changed how we perceive and negotiate our way around
local areas, especially but not exclusively in cities, because of the dense net-
works of digital information available for users to navigate the urban environ-
ment, using smartphones and other networked devices. Thus, as Gordon and
de Souza e Silva (2011) argue in the first opening quotation, localities and espe-
cially urban spaces are becoming ‘hybridized’, with digitized layers of informa-
tion interposed between us and the physical environment by navigation tools,
often embedded with commercial recommendations, photos and videos posted
on platforms such as YouTube and Instagram, and commentary in blogs and
on platforms such as Twitter. Indeed, this abundance of information creates
the need to filter out what is most useful, attractive, or entertaining, producing
selection processes enabled by social media platforms which may, ironically for
technologies which are often widely available, intensify existing patterns of so-
cial segmentation, stratification, and inequality (Boy and Uitermark 2016).
Second, this production and circulation of urban imagery and other user-
generated content breaks the representational monopoly of local and national
leaders, as well as that of the one-to-many media platforms which have helped
leaders disseminate their messages and secure consent for their policies – plat-
forms ranging from parish magazines and political pamphlets to regional news-
papers and national television and radio (Watt 2008). Using social media, audi-
ences may become not mere observers but participants who can contest and
challenge received understandings, as they fill comment sections on websites,
tweet their thoughts, share their ideas on Facebook, post YouTube videos, or re-
circulate content (which, at scale, can generate the phenomenon of content
‘going viral’). And yet the evidence of our case studies suggests that local actors
still have limited power to challenge national media frames; indeed, social
media may function predominantly rather as channels to reinforce dominant
stereotypes, both by recirculating stereotypically framed material, and by pro-
ducing new material framed in terms of dominant stereotypes.
In Chapter 11 Liebmann draws on fieldwork from Groruddalen, an East Oslo
suburb with a large ethnic minority population, and Kristansand in Southern
Norway. In opening, she uses a vignette from Groruddalen which provides a
good example of both the digital hybridization of locality and the unintended
Perspectives: Theorizing Mediatized Civic Settings and Cultural Conflict 157
Brought to you by | Kingston University
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/21/19 5:31 PM
stigmatizing effects of a potentially emancipatory technology. She describes the
injured response of local resident ‘Zunair’ to a video posted on social media by
another young man, an ethnic Norwegian from the other side of town, who re-
corded his apparently ‘horrific’ experience of an accidental visit to Groruddalen
when he overslept on the train. While the stigmatizing video, posted by a mem-
ber of an ethnic majority and feeding into existing media stereotypes (ECRI
2015), may readily gain traction in the social media marketplace, minority
views may struggle to attract similar levels of attention. Hence while social
media offer new vistas on localities and in theory the possibility to challenge
mainstream and official representations, in practice minority voices may be
drowned out by a torrent of re-hashed stereotypes, and the weakening of official
representations mainly serve to remove barriers that once obstructed this flow.
Similarly, the findings of Chapters 10 and 12 tend to support the view that
while Web 2.0 technologies in theory offer media audiences opportunities to par-
ticipate in, and hence potentially co-construct, emergent media landscapes, in
practice, at least in these cases, the sense of a national media frame, fed by pow-
erful transnational media discourses, remains dominant, offering limited oppor-
tunities for interruption, let alone co-construction. Thus, in his study of local
church discourse on refugees in Chapter 9, Repstad finds no warrant for national
media and politicians’ claims that church leaders’ liberal views on asylum are at
odds with those of local congregations. Yet neither the preponderance of positive
attitudes of active local Christians towards refugees, at least as presented on
church websites and in newsletters, nor their practical mobilization to support
refugee welfare, nor the liberal statements of the national leadership of the
most powerful religious institution in Norway, the Lutheran church, appear suf-
ficient to interrupt dominant national media and political discourses. Indeed,
this case fits with the narrative of historical mediatization described by Hjarvard
and Lundby in Chapter 3, which holds that ‘in order to reach public attention
through the news media, religious issues should fit the media’s news values.’
On the other hand, Repstad’s case shows that the national negative media
frame does not determine the content of local discourses; while the local may
not interrupt the national, at least the local retains some autonomy.
In Chapter 12, Hansen and Herbert report that ethnic Danish and minority
heritage Muslims in Copenhagen often expressed exhaustion at their experience
of an unrelenting flow of negative mainstream representation, and most experi-
enced apparently little sense of empowerment flowing from their social media
participation. However, some research has found social media significant in pro-
viding space for minority empowerment. For example, in the Netherlands Leurs,
Midden, and Ponzanesi (2012) report on how the social media platform Hyves
was used by Dutch Moroccan women to organize street protests against Dutch
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politician Geert Wilders’ proposal for a ‘kopvoddentax’ (‘head-rag tax’), an-
nounced to Parliament on 16 September 2009. Organized online under the head-
ing Wij Willen Geen Hoofddoek Verbod! (We want no headscarf ban!), the site at-
tracted 15,000 followers and led to protests in several locations across the
Netherlands before the proposal was dropped. The researchers locate this activ-
ity in the broader context of Internet discussion platforms providing ‘hush har-
bours’ for sharing experiences of hostility and offering mutual support in the
context negative public framing of Islam and Muslim practice in the Nether-
lands. For example, one platform for Dutch Moroccans, Marokko.nl, ‘is estimated
to reach a remarkable 70 to 75 percent of Moroccan-Dutch youth in the age cat-
egory of 15 to 35’ (ibid., 159). The researchers conclude that these online spaces:
not only offer an important critique of mainstream media debates on multiculturalism, but
also create space for alternative bottom-up interpretations of everyday practices of multi-
culturalism in the Netherlands. (ibid.)
Internet forums and social media platforms have also provided the organization-
al infrastructure for acts of inter-religious solidarity in Denmark and Norway, in-
cluding the human ring formed around the synagogue in Oslo organized by
young Muslims in the wake of the shootings at a synagogue in Copenhagen in
February 2015 (Hovland 2015). Social media use enables rapid and widespread
mobilization across space; thus, the ring of solidarity idea was a response to
an attack in Denmark which led to action in Oslo, Norway, then was re-used
in Bergen, and an earlier ‘March Against Terror’ in September 2014 in Oslo
was re-used in Kristiansand.² In such mediatized events, the use of urban
space is both enabled through the digital infrastructure supporting its organiza-
tion and amplified in impact by the circulation of the images generated. Thus,
while our case studies show some negative impacts of social media on minority
stigmatization, there are clearly other sides to the story.
Such social media networks may be understood as constituting ‘counter-
publics’, meaning ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated
social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses … to formulate opposition-
al interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’ (Fraser 1990, 67), and
which may produce ‘offline’ social and political action. This role of social
media does not seem to fit easily into the typology of media dynamics in medi-
atized conflicts supplied by Hjarvard and Lundby in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1; see also
Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015, 10). Perhaps it best fits the metaphor of
‘media as environment’ and the dynamic of ‘co-structuring’, as the affordances
 Observed by Sivin Kit for the Cultural Conflict 2.0 project, field notes September 2014.
Perspectives: Theorizing Mediatized Civic Settings and Cultural Conflict 159
Brought to you by | Kingston University
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/21/19 5:31 PM
of the social media platform structure the form that contributions to debates take
(a kind of formatting – Instagram enables curated visual representations, Twitter
favours aphoristic sloganeering etc.). However, while the platforms used operate
in a broad commercial environment shaped by relations of power (Facebook, In-
stagram, and Twitter are all monetized commercial platforms), so that the media
practices of users are in some sense ‘embedded in … structural relations of
power’, it is not clear how this influences them, and social media practices dis-
played on these platforms do not seem necessarily to reinforce these ‘relations of
power’, but rather, may, under some conditions (modestly) redistribute power
across networks, and indeed at a local level (by virtue of the concentration of
network participants within a locality), for example by distributing counter-im-
ages, as with the positive representations of refugees in local church communi-
cations found by Repstad (Chapter 10).
While Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær recognize that ‘the relationship be-
tween media and conﬂict does not constitute a one-way street from media to so-
cial actors’ (2015, 10), and write of social actors ‘using’ media and media being
‘implicated in stratified systems of social power’ (ibid.), neither ‘use’ (by an in-
tending agent) nor ‘implication’ within a stratified system seems to quite capture
the networked dynamics of social media power. Rather, the power of social
media is somehow more ‘distributed’ – not so much under the control of power-
ful individual (or corporate) actors as mass media power – yet capable of being
activated by the posting of a single image, as the term ‘going viral’ suggests.
Maybe this is a kind of ‘co-structuring’, though not of an incremental, gradual
kind, as that term may suggest, but something more rapid and volatile; such
power is the product neither of individual will nor of institutional formation,
but rather of the networked crowd. Perhaps then, Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Es-
kjær’s (2015) model could use an extra, fourth media metaphor, that of the ‘net-
work’, with its characteristic dynamic of ‘circulation’ and ‘influence’ of ‘in-
creased volatility’ which creates ‘potential for disruption of dominant
representations, but also for their retrenchment’.
The counter-publics enabled by social media – whether ethnic minority
hush harbours or regional subcultures (such as Repstad’s churches in Chap-
ter 10) – also suggest a mechanism which might disrupt the ‘spiral of silence’
dynamic (Noelle-Neumann 1984) identified by Hjarvard and Lundby (Chapter 3),
whereby majority viewpoints become more dominant in public discussions as
dissenters become reluctant to contribute, once a dominant position is establish-
ed. Certainly, our Danish interviewees (Chapter 12) illustrate this spiral, as inter-
viewees expressed reluctance to contribute to public forums due to the over-
whelmingly negative responses received. However, the formation of social
media networks might also interrupt this process, by providing forums in
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which minority opinions form a critical mass empowered to challenge dominant
positions.While this might contribute to a ‘filter bubble’ effect (Pariser 2011), in-
creasing fragmentation of public opinion, this is unlikely for minorities, who are
not likely to be unaware of dominant media frames. Rather, such counter-publics
can enable the strengthening of minorities through the development of solidar-
ity, and may empower them to intervene in the public sphere at opportune mo-
ments (as with the anti-head scarf ban protest, or the human ring initiatives).
Furthermore, both Scandinavian and Dutch counter-publics discussed sug-
gest the importance of spatial relations for grasping the dynamics of interaction
between media and locality. In several cases, online activity galvanizes protest
enacted at specific significant sites; and in Groruddalen we see an example of
the uneven spatial distribution of religious diversity in Scandinavia, which, it
will be argued, is central to understanding the dynamics of mediatized civic con-
flicts in this region.
9.3 Place Matters: The Uneven Spatial
Distribution of Religious Diversity, Practice,
and Fear of Difference in Scandinavia
Non-European immigrants tend to be more religious – typically Muslims or Christians –
than their host populations. … The limited evidence for second-generation minority popu-
lations suggests that religious decline will occur more slowly (if at all) among them than it
has among the majority population. … We may begin to see ‘de-secularization’ in Western
Europe in the coming decades. Indeed, this is already visible in the continent’s religiously
vibrant immigration cities. (Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012, 71–86)
Debates for or against the banning of the construction of mosques and/or minarets reveal
the tumultuous transition of Muslims from the status of the invisible migrant worker to that
of visible Muslim citizenship. … Public visibility is approached therefore as a radically dis-
ruptive, transgressive, provocative form of transformative agency that is intrinsically related
to the political process of becoming citizens. (Göle 2011, 383)
The presence and hence experience of religious diversity in Scandinavia, as else-
where in Europe, is not evenly distributed spatially. Rather, it is the major cities
which are the sites of significant religious diversity, due both to initial immigrant
settlement patterns and ongoing residents’ constraints and choices. Thus, it is in
the Scandinavian capitals of Oslo, Copenhagen, and Stockholm, and some larger
regional cities such as Malmö, that higher concentrations of visible minority
populations exist, often focused residentially in particular neighbourhoods. It
is here that Pentecostal churches and mosques are mostly located (where plan-
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ning permission can be obtained), and it is on these neighbourhoods that media
attention is often focused, with coverage of religion uneasily mingled with anxi-
eties about public safety, urban disorder, and criminality, and prone to prolifer-
ate into periodic moral panics (Bangstad 2011).While immigrant, especially asy-
lum seeker, settlement policies to some extent offset these patterns, for example
creating settlements of Sri Lankan Tamils (mostly Hindu) in the coastal towns of
Arctic Norway (Guribye 2011), the pattern of urban concentration predominates.
Indeed, it is not just religious diversity that is unevenly distributed spatially,
but religious participation. As pointed out in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, Scandina-
vians have amongst the lowest levels of religious observance in the world, but
the immigrants, and especially refugees, arriving in Scandinavia’s major cities
come from some of the most religiously observant societies globally, notably
from Africa and the Middle East. While it should not be assumed that all will
wish or choose to maintain this observance, assumptions informed by seculari-
zation theory that minorities will rapidly assimilate to Northern European norms
in this respect are not supported by empirical studies.
Thus, van Tubergen (2006) found that British and Dutch immigrants (from
several major religions, and 12 percent with no religious affiliation) had a weekly
congregational attendance rate of 34 percent and 33 percent respectively (ibid.,
10), compared with national rates of 17 percent and 12 percent, suggesting con-
siderable differences between migrant and majority populations. Amongst Mus-
lims, Güveli and Platt (2010, 1027) found weekly mosque attendance rates for
British and Dutch Muslims of 67 percent and 47 percent respectively, roughly
four times higher than amongst the national population in both countries. Sup-
porting these findings, Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts (2012) found that
amongst Dutch Muslims, whereas data before 1998 suggested a ‘linear trend to-
wards secularization over time and over generations’, evidence from 1998–2006
shows a ‘striking revival among the second generation’, leading them to con-
clude that, ‘forces of secularization such as educational attainment and genera-
tional replacement gradually lose their predictive power’ (2012, 359).
Similar patterns may be found in Scandinavia. Certainly, fear of the conse-
quences of religious diversity also seems to be unevenly distributed spatially
here, paradoxically highest in areas of least diversity, especially where these
are near major urban centres; a ‘halo effect’ of media-driven anxiety about the
ethnic other. One source of evidence for this is voting patterns: support for
anti-immigrant political parties is strongest in areas with fewer immigrants
and ethnic minorities. Thus, in Denmark in the 2015 elections support for the
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) was strongest in the areas of
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Southern Jutland (Sydjylland) and Sjælland, located away from the major urban
centres (Politiken, 2015³). In Norway, support for the Progress Party (Fremskritt-
spartiet, FrP) in the 2013 elections was strongest in rural and small-town areas
close to major urban areas (e.g. Vestfold with 19.5 percent and Telemark with
19 percent, compared to Oslo with 11.7 percent [Statistics Norway 2015]⁴). This
pattern repeated in Sweden’s 2015 elections, where the Swedish Democrats
were strongest outside Stockholm in Södermanlands län (13.4 percent) and out-
side Malmö in Blekinge län (14.1 percent), while in Stockholm proper the party
received 5.8 percent and in Malmö, 8.9 percent (Statistics Sweden 2017⁵). These
lower rates in the major cities are more than the effect of minorities themselves
not supporting these parties – as these groups constitute small minorities in
most areas, and tend to vote less (Scuzarello, 2015), these voting patterns mostly
reflect differing majority population preferences in urban and rural areas.
So,why are people living in areas with fewer immigrants more worried about
immigration than those living in areas with more immigrants? Survey evidence
points to the processes which might be involved. Duffy and Frere-Smith analysed
Ipsos-MORI polls conducted in the UK from 2006–2011, finding that immigration
was consistently perceived as a much greater problem nationally (69–76 per-
cent) than locally (15–28 percent; 2014, 90). This suggests a dominant role for
the national media in the production of anxieties about immigration (closely as-
sociated with religious diversity in the Scandinavian context). The mechanism
could be that those who live in areas of lower immigrant concentration fear
what they perceive through the media, which tend to over-represent conflict in
general (due to its higher ‘news value’, Jewkes 2011), and especially conflict re-
lating to immigration and Muslims (ECRI 2015). In this context, short-term en-
counters such as visits to major cities tend may be read in the light of dominant
media narratives. In contrast, residents in major cities, accustomed to living with
diversity, are less fearful of it but aware (again, through the media) of concerns
elsewhere in society. Either way, we find an uneven pattern of concern, with
media coverage likely to be the major factor shaping it.
This evidence of the power of media frames to shape our perceptions of
other localities – beyond our immediate neighbourhood where we must rely
 Wikipedia, s.v. Wahlkarte Folketing Dänemark 2015, last modified 19 June 2015, https://com-
mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wahlkarte_Folketing_D%C3%A4nemark_2015_da.svg
 Statistics Norway, “Storting election 2013: Valid votes, by party/electoral list and county,”
http://www.ssb.no/196612/storting-election-2013.valid-votes-by-party-electoral-list-and-county.p-
er-cent-sy-7
 Statistics Sweden, “General elections, results,” http://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statis-
tics-by-subject-area/democracy/general-elections/general-elections-results/
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on mediated sources – comes from the UK, but there are good reasons to think
that similar mechanisms are at work in Scandinavia. While concerns about im-
migration are higher in the UK, concerns about religious diversity run at similar
levels – for example, the wish to restrict Muslim immigration runs at the same
level in Denmark and the UK (46 percent agree with the statements ‘allow
few’ or ‘no’ Muslim immigrants), at comparable level in Norway (34.4 percent),
though significantly lower in Sweden (19 percent, European Social Survey
2014). Thus, the scale of public concern is broadly similar. But more importantly
the key ingredients – powerful negative media frames shaping perceptions of im-
migration and Islam, and an inverse relationship between local experience of di-
versity and anxieties about it – are present in each case; in the UK, residents in
‘low migration small towns and rural areas’ are twice as likely to want to restrict
immigration as residents in ‘superdiverse’ London (Duffy and Frere Smith 2013,
22), similar to the distribution suggested by voting patterns in Scandinavia.
9.4 Governance and Challenges for Civic
Leadership
Mediatisation changes the logic of governance. It introduces new stakes for governance ac-
tors as their actions are … perceived through a media gaze. (Uitermark and Gielen 2010,
1327)
In the kind of mediatized civic environments described, local (as well as nation-
al) leaders face new challenges in the management of cultural conflicts. As na-
tional and international conflicts percolate through different media channels,
they may create or amplify local tensions. When satellite and digital communi-
cations transcend national borders, local disputes may escalate rapidly into in-
ternational incidents, as with the Danish Muhammad cartoons controversy in
2005–2006 (Lindekilde, Mouritsen, and Zapata-Barrero 2009). Similarly, since
people are entangled in extensive and complex media landscapes, local civic re-
lations may be affected by distant events, or even by their anticipation. For ex-
ample, Uitermark and Gielen (2010) found in their study of the Amsterdam
neighbourhood De Baarjes in aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh in
2004, that local government officials were strongly influenced by their anticipa-
tion of national media coverage, adopting a kind of proactive media-oriented
stance, more than they were informed by a detailed grasp of local civic dynam-
ics, with damaging consequences for the latter in the long run.
This mediatization of local politics needs to be understood in the context of
the neo-liberalization of governance in Northern European cities, part of a global
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pattern. While Scandinavian societies may be less affected than others, due to
the strength of social welfare model of democracy, they are not exempt. Neolib-
eralism is understood here as ‘a series of contemporary projects of capital accu-
mulation that, beginning in the 1970s, sought to reconstitute social relations of
production including the organization of labour, space, state institutions, milita-
ry power, governance, membership and sovereignty’ (Glick-Schiller 2011, 213–4).
Neo-liberal ideologies advocate increasing the scope of market logics, bringing
purchaser–provider relationships into areas of social provision previously domi-
nated by the welfare state and professional norms, and emphasizing the ex-
change value of urban space at the expense of its multiple use values (Lefebvre
1991).
In the field of local governance, as elsewhere, this is has led to a disruption
of established relationships between residents, welfare institutions, and local au-
thorities. For example, analysing the case of the Dutch national community de-
velopment agency Wijkalliantie (Neighbourhood Alliance), which they see as in-
dicative of trends across Western Europe to bring private entrepreneurial
organizations into local governance, Uitermark and Duyvendak argue that ‘frag-
mented and transparent institutions have to compete in a new landscape domi-
nated by periodical evaluations and quick shifts in policy … Flexibility for fi-
nancers, including politicians, administrators and charities, has at the same
time meant instability for professionals and citizens’ (2008, 117).
So, in contrast to previous practice where, through processes of consultation
and discussion, ‘residents defined which discourses were legitimate’, now ‘gov-
ernmental organizations formulate a discourse that primarily reflects the con-
cerns of … their financially and politically powerful partners … and subsequently
try to find residents who are willing and able to ground this discourse institu-
tionally in disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ (ibid., 115).
Parallel impacts of mediatization and neo-liberalism are suggested by Lieb-
mann’s study of organized cultural encounters in an Oslo neighbourhood (Chap-
ter 11). First, local projects must compete for funding in a competitive environ-
ment (neoliberalism), then mediatization shapes what funding is available,
especially national media-driven frames of reference formed by anxieties related
to security, which influence the cultural programmes of local organizations.
Thus, the influence of media frames may be refracted both through local govern-
ment policies (as in the Dutch examples) and national funding programmes (as
in Groruddalen and Kristiansand), impacting local civic dynamics.
Perspectives: Theorizing Mediatized Civic Settings and Cultural Conflict 165
Brought to you by | Kingston University
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/21/19 5:31 PM
9.5 What Makes Diverse Neighbourhoods Work?
Converging Evidence, and a Research–Policy
Rupture
A feature common to many European countries is that the body of scientiﬁcally based
knowledge on immigrant integration has increased substantially, while at the same time
public authorities seem to have become less interested in making use of the assembled
knowledge. … Although the idea of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ has gained wide recog-
nition discursively, strong evidence also exists that politicians and policymakers often use
scientiﬁc research for symbolic rather than instrumental purposes. (Scholten 2015, 2)
In concluding this introduction to shaping cultural conflicts in mediatized civic
settings, and given the challenges facing local leaders implied by this account, it
may be useful to consider briefly empirical evidence and theories on what makes
diverse neighbourhoods ‘work’, and, given the problem of the spatial distribu-
tion of anxieties about cultural difference, to ask, what might reduce fears in
less diverse regions? In addressing these topics, on the one hand there is good
news that several theoretical perspectives and a range of empirical studies con-
verge on which features help make diverse neighbourhoods work (and may be
transferable to less diverse areas), and on what impacts on the anxieties that un-
derlie prejudices. On the other hand, as Scholten argues, it is unfortunate that
across Europe, precisely because of the dominant media frames concerning im-
migration and Islam that they must negotiate and the political dynamics these
have generated, politicians and policy makers are reluctant to act on such evi-
dence-led recommendations.
First, several theories (superdiversity,Vertovec 2007; contact, Al Ramiah and
Hewstone 2013; political participation, Scuzzarello 2015), are both well-ground-
ed in empirical studies and concur that development and public recognition of
multiple, intersecting, and overlapping roles and identities is critical to success-
ful social integration. In other words, seeing that others who are different in
some respects (e.g. religion, ethnicity) also have overlapping interests and
roles (e.g. as parents, neighbours, school governors, tenants, etc.), combined
with a basic level of civility in public contact, seems sufficient to form the
basis of mutual recognition necessary for the development of trust between
neighbours and a localized sense of a shared public good, even in very diverse
neighbourhoods (Wessendorf, 2014). On this basis engagement with and accept-
ance of divergent aspects of identity may develop.
In fact, it seems that conditions in more diverse neighbourhoods, with an es-
tablished history of migration and with many immigrants from different back-
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grounds, seem work in favour of civic integration (Hickman and Mai 2015). This
may be because in these conditions it is difficult for the binary categories around
which prejudice is formed (us and them, long-time resident and newcomer, Mus-
lim and Dane, as we shall see in Chapter 12), to develop. And this may be why
less diverse regions pose greater challenges, as it is easier for such binary cate-
gories to take hold. Nonetheless, programmes which build on contact and para-
contact theory show that even in some of the most unpromising conditions (e.g.
in Israel–Palestine, where ‘natural’ inter-ethnic contact is limited and binary cat-
egorization reinforced by most social processes), school programmes which com-
bine education with extended contact and constructive interaction can have a
major impact on attitudes (Berger et al., 2016).
9.6 Conclusion
This survey of evidence on the relationship between the changing media land-
scape, civic settings and cultural conflict, framing Scandinavia in a European
context, suggests complex challenges facing both future research and policy.
While macro, structural factors have always impacted local civic relations,
which in turn have their own logics not reducible to structure, and national
and regional media have long been a significant link between scales, the evi-
dence reviewed suggests social media significantly intensifies and complicates
these links, introducing new dynamics whose effects are hard to predict, as
they include both amplifying the dominance of national media frames (e.g. me-
diatization of local governance in Amsterdam), and empowering marginalised
groups to resist the political effects of such framing (the Dutch Muslim anti-
headscarf ban campaign). For researchers, this implies the need for constant at-
tention to factors operative at different scales and their mediated interconnec-
tion. For policy makers and advisers, the challenge has the added difficulty
that the field has become not just intensely mediatized but politicised by popu-
list discourses which frame relations between majorities and minorities antago-
nistically, mobilizing a divisive binary worldview which ‘pits a virtuous and ho-
mogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous “others” who are
depicted as depriving … the sovereign people of their rights, values, identity,
and voice’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3). Furthermore, this competitive
framing may be intensified by the neo-liberalization of local governance.
Under these conditions, evidence based policies of inclusion meet a sceptical re-
ception, even when based on well-grounded theories, as both may be dismissed
as mere ‘expert opinion’ in populist rhetoric. But, surely in Scandinavia, with its
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traditions of social equality, high value placed on education and inclusivity, they
may yet prevail?
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